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1
 I am grateful to Sijbren Cnossen, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and others at the conference for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper but I am of course solely responsible for its contents. Given the scope of the material 
surveyed here and the need for brevity, not only are many issues touched on only in footnotes but a rather long list 
of references -- including no doubt too many self-references – is included. 
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‘Go west, young man’ is one of the many popular quotations that appears never to have been said by 
(any of) its purported authors.2  Nonetheless, these words capture in essence the advice given to many 
an ambitious American in the late 19th century – the period of the opening up of the west in the United 
States. Equally, aspiring tax policy experts in the post-World War Two period who were too young to 
have played any role in the war and immediate postwar reforms in their own countries might have been  
well advised to ‘go South’ if what they wanted to do was to play an active role in developing and 
implementing tax reforms. How else could someone fresh out of graduate school have a chance not only 
to design major new taxes and to analyze a variety of complex policy questions but also to have the 
analysis taken seriously by decision-makers?   
Following in the footsteps of such pioneers as Carl Shoup and Richard Musgrave, over the last half 
century many economists from developed countries have dispensed advice on tax reform to developing 
countries – often, whether they had asked for such advice or not.  The life of such peripatetic tax 
advisers has not always been one of wine and roses.   Quite apart from any hazards associated with field 
work, those who wished to storm the heights of academia were not always well-advised to spend too 
much time on this path at a time when increasing emphasis was being placed on contributions to 
theoretical and econometric matters that were for the most part  far removed from those that had to be 
used in a field in which the tool needed was more often a sturdy machete to clear away the underbrush 
than the latest finely tuned analytical tool to analyze data that did not exist.3   Nonetheless, those with 
strong policy interests who were open to new experiences and willing not only to travel but also to 
spend the time and effort required to understand the institutional settings in which they worked 
undoubtedly did much fruitful work over the last half century or so both by bringing new ideas and 
analysis to fiscal vineyards around the world and by calling attention to the many important facets of 
reality that were not easily encompassed by prevailing wisdom.    
Those engaged in such tasks inevitably learned much about the real world and about how to “do” tax 
policy. Two stars of the academic world, Peter Diamond and Emanuel Saez (2011), recently said that “…a 
                                                          
2
 See http://www.llrx.com/features/quotedetective.htm.  
3
 The dilemma facing such advisers was clearly stated in Krugman (1993), which basically argues that most work 
done on development economics before about 1990 was essentially useless  and irrelevant because it was not 
based on the kind of formal, testable models that had over the preceding two decades become the ‘gold standard’ 
in academic economics.  While there is much truth in this view, even the best such model often leaves one a long 
way from devising a workable solution to a real problem in the real world. Economic theory and economic policy 
are and should be closely related: but they are not the same and, as noted later, the relevant knowledge does not 
flow only in one direction.  
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result from basic research is relevant for policy only if (a) it is based on economic mechanisms that are 
empirically relevant and first order to the problem, (b) it is reasonably robust to changes in the modeling 
assumptions, (c) the policy prescription is implementable (i.e. is socially acceptable and is not too 
complex).” This is precisely the approach followed for many years by good policy analysts like Roy Bahl.  
However, although the middle ground between grand theory and case studies – the space within which 
policy-relevant approaches to good development tax policy presumably lurk – remains largely 
undeveloped, the heyday of foreign ‘fiscal doctors’ is perhaps now past. Before reaching this conclusion, 
however, it is useful first to review what the standard approach to tax policy in developing countries has 
been over the past half-century.   
An important characteristic of much foreign tax advice in the initial decades after World War Two was 
that no one asked for it.  Instead, advice and advisors, short-term and long-term, initially arrived on 
foreign shores largely at the initiative of the victorious powers such as Britain, France and the United 
States.  In all too many instances, the tax policies suggested reflected those currently in place in the 
advisor’s home country.4   In other cases, ideas currently under discussion, though not implemented, in 
the home country were suggested for implementation abroad. 5  Finally, in a few instances, ideas were 
developed at home specifically for export.6  Of course, even among the earliest foreign tax studies some 
– though usually incorporating elements of each of these models – transcended them to some extent 
                                                          
4
 For a beautiful example of how the sales taxes initially imposed in francophone Africa mirror almost perfectly the 
version of the tax prevailing in France a few years earlier, see Hill (1977).  France was of course not the only source 
of such ideas, and Africa by no means the only recipient: every advisor carries with him knowledge of his own 
system and is usually eager to share it with others.  A particularly important instance of the wholesale imposition 
of a foreign tax policy model is the ‘soviet-type’ (command economy) tax system, originally developed in the USSR 
as part of its planning system and subsequently adopted in substantial part throughout the so-called Sino-Soviet 
Bloc in the decade after World War Two (Wanless 1985).  The story of how this system was replaced in what 
became called the ‘transitional countries’ towards the end of the 20
th
 century is nicely summarized in Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2000) but not further discussed here. 
5
 For a classic account of how a theoretical fiscal concept (land revenue) that was never accepted as a policy 
instrument at home came to be firmly implanted in India in the late 18
th
 century, see Stokes (1989). Little had 
changed in this respect in the late 20
th
 century: for two examples, see (Goode 1961) on the (brief) adoption of a 
personal expenditure tax in India and what was then Ceylon and some aspects of the more recent history of 
income tax reform (Bird and Zolt 2005). 
6
 The income taxes initially imposed in much of anglophone Africa as well as other British territories around the 
world – and still found in e.g. Iraq as late as the beginning of the present century –  were largely derived from a 
’model’ income tax devised by an interdepartmental committee in London in 1922 (Thuronyi 2003). Although such 
later efforts as the ‘Basic World Tax Code’ (Hussey and Lubick 1992) never had such success, the tendency to 
devise an all-purpose model to serve different ‘clients’ remains strong in the tax advisory business.  
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and had an important and lasting impact on subsequent tax policy development in the countries 
concerned.7 
The bilateral aid programs that began to flourish in the 1960s were based both in the countries just 
mentioned (often focused mainly on their former colonies) and to a lesser extent in other developed 
countries.  As time went on, however, the array of regional and multinational agencies established in the 
post-Bretton Woods world – the UN, the World Bank, and above all the IMF, particularly after the 
establishment of its Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) in 1964 -- became the major players in the fiscal 
advice arena.  Even when not formally initiated or financed by the developed countries in one guise or 
another the modus operandi of most fiscal missions continued to be very much along what may perhaps 
be labeled, with no disrespect to either side intended, the ‘teacher-student’  path. 8     
Foreign fiscal advice to developing countries has always been driven as much by the training, experience 
and interests of those giving the advice as by any specific need for advice perceived by the recipient 
countries.  As discussed in the next section, the advice given changed over time both because our 
understanding of theoretical and empirical public economics changed and because more and more 
advisers were increasingly exposed to reality in a variety of developing countries.  Time also changed 
how advice was received, owing both to increasing technical capacity in recipient countries and to 
changes in the political and economic realities they confronted.   The resulting changes in both the 
‘supply’ and the ‘demand’ curves for foreign tax advice suggest, or so this paper argues, that increasing 
substitution of domestic for foreign suppliers is both inevitable and on the whole a good thing although 
there may remain an important – but very different – role for both foreign aid and to a lesser extent 
foreign experts in helping to improve fiscal outcomes in developing countries. 
 
Fifty Years of Fiscal Advice9 
The three decades between the end of World War II and the first oil crisis of the mid-1970s were on the 
whole years of growth and prosperity in most developed countries.   Experience first with successful 
government-led success in war and then with rapid and generally equalizing market-led growth 
                                                          
7
 Perhaps the classic example is the famous Shoup (1949) report in Japan – a report that to this day remains the 
benchmark for tax discussion in Japan -- although few of its many recommendations remained in force for long 
(Brownlee, Ide and Fukagai, forthcoming). 
8
It should be noted, however, that some early major studies e.g.in Venezuela (Shoup 1959) and Indonesia (Gillis 
1985) were largely organized and funded by the countries themselves. 
9
 Much of the material in this section draws heavily on earlier discussions in Bird (2011, 2012). 
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inevitably shaped the ideas of the few people – mainly economists – who were beginning in the 1950s 
and 1960s to think about tax issues in the very heterogeneous group of developing countries, many of 
which were then in the process of emerging from colonial status.  
Over the past fifty years both academic researchers and international institutions -- sometimes following 
ideas suggested by research, sometimes responding to populist fads or pressures from the politically 
powerful --  have issued many policy prescriptions with respect to how to improve economic growth and 
development in poor countries: increase capital investment; improve education; control population; 
liberalize trade and capital markets; reduce government controls on market activities; and so on, and on 
(Easterly 2002).  Each of these policies has at times been marketed as a universal “silver bullet” that will 
result in improved economic performance wherever applied. Unfortunately, none has worked as 
advertised.   
The standard approach to tax and development has similarly undergone a number of major model 
changes over the years, with various stages in between and the extent of ‘beta testing’ or ‘piloting’ 
varying sharply from model to model.  Much has been learned about taxation and development over the 
last half-century.   However, we still have much to learn.  Even the best research answers to particular 
questions have usually turned out to be extremely difficult to apply in practice. Moreover, since even 
the best research is only one of many inputs into policy-making,  the task is not only to improve research 
on tax and development but also to improve how knowledge is marketed to those who can, if they wish, 
put the knowledge to use.  Whatever approach is taken, despite the understandable desire of many to 
find a relatively simple model with which to understand and manipulate complex reality, there is no 
magical fiscal medicine, the swallowing of which will always and everywhere be beneficial.  What this 
complex and changing world needs is less such a non-existent ‘universal fix’ than a fiscal medicine kit 
containing a variety of remedies and treatments directed at the variety of fiscal problems and needs 
which arise at different times and often in different ways in different developing countries. Of course, 
the core contents of the ‘tax kit’ are still likely to be similar in most countries but what is considered to 
be the ‘core’ has changed markedly over time.   
Development Tax Model 1.0    
In the beginning (c.1960), the accepted academic view of good tax policy was, more or less, that the 
ideal tax was a broad-based personal income tax with progressive rates that included capital gains in the 
tax base and was integrated with the corporate income tax in order to make both the decision to 
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incorporate and the choice between debt and equity finance more neutral (Auerbach 2010). This 
concise summary tells the story: it was all about the income tax, especially in English-speaking countries.  
The report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation (1966) was called ‘a landmark in the annals of 
taxation’ by Harberger (1968) precisely because it was the most detailed attempt to turn these ideas 
into practical policy recommendations.10   
It is thus not surprising that what might be called version 1.0 of the (implicit) Development Tax Model 
(Figure 1) essentially set out a progressive comprehensive personal income tax as the ideal tax for 
developing (as for developed) countries. Indirect consumption taxes were considered to be at best as a 
necessary evil, and both the international and sub-national aspects of taxation were generally neglected.  
Moreover, in line with the prevailing post-war Keynesian view of ‘government as leader’ most expert 
advisers urged not just better (more progressive) but more taxes as necessary to development (Kaldor 
1963).  For twenty years or more such eminent foreign advisers as Kaldor, Shoup,  Musgrave and their 
followers generally recommended packages based on variants of this model to all comers.11 
Figure 1 - Development Tax Model 1.0 
Increase level of taxation 
Increase progressivity 
Comprehensive personal income tax the ideal 
Consumption taxes a necessary evil 
Sub-national taxation – largely ignored 
International aspects – largely ignored 
 
Unfortunately, the outcome of this advice was not all that impressive.  In contrast to the earlier post-
war years (Chelliah 1971) during the 1970s and 1980s relatively few developing countries significantly 
increased their tax-GDP ratios (Bahl and Bird 2008).  Structurally, however, two important changes did 
occur in most countries: the introduction of the VAT and the general lowering and flattening of statutory 
income tax rates.  Each of these changes might perhaps be interpreted as illustrating the success of good 
tax advice.  The downward shift of personal and corporate income tax rates was supported both by 
                                                          
10
 As previously noted with respect to the Shoup report in Japan, however, few of the more fundamental 
recommendations of the Royal Commission report were fully accepted in Canada (Bird and Bucovetsky 1972)  
11
 I was no exception: see Bird (1970). The selected readings included in successive editions of Bird and Oldman 
(1964, 1967, 1975, 1990) provide a useful sampling of the changing literature in the field over time.  
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developments in economic theory and by research results demonstrating the potentially large efficiency 
costs of high marginal tax rates. Similarly, to some extent at least the widespread adoption of VAT can 
perhaps be attributed to the more favorable views of consumption taxes emerging in the literature in 
these decades as well as to the argument that this way of taxing consumption is less economically 
distorting than most other forms of indirect taxation.  Whether for these reasons or others, it was clear 
by the end of the 1980s that a new standard model of development taxation had emerged.      
Development Tax Model 2.0 
One way to think of this new model, as set out, for instance, World Bank (1991) and sketched in Figure 2 
might perhaps be as the fiscal component of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ that ruled the policy 
roost after the early 1980s.12 
Figure 2 – Development Tax Model 2.0 
Value added tax as the main revenue pillar 
Substantial reductions in import tariffs 
Income taxes – broader bases but lower rates 
Few or no tax incentives  
Excises for revenue (and externality pricing) 
Sub-national taxation essentially property tax 
 
The main pillar of development tax policy in this model was no longer the personal income tax but the 
VAT (value-added tax), preferably imposed at a single rate and on a broad base (Ebrill et al. 2001).  One 
reason for placing VAT at the fiscal center in many countries was the increasing emphasis – first through 
GATT and then the WTO -- on the need for signatory countries to impose lower and more uniform 
import tariffs. Income taxes, both personal and corporate, remained important sources of revenue in 
many countries but preferably with lower rates and broader bases – and less use of tax incentives. 
Although growing interest in decentralization issues led to more attention being paid to local 
governments, for the most part they were simply told to make better use of the traditional property tax.  
Interestingly, although some attention was paid to the continuing importance of traditional excises, 
almost never were payroll taxes or non-tax revenues, important though such revenues are in some 
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 Elsewhere, it has been labelled the BBLR (broad base low rate) model (Bird 2011a). 
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countries, taken into account in tax discussions.  Finally, although more nuanced, as with Model 1.0 the 
underlying message to most developing countries with respect to tax levels continued to be that ‘more 
is better.’  
Since VAT did become more important in many countries (Bird and Gendron 2007) and income tax rates 
declined almost everywhere (Peter, Duncan and Buttrick 2011), at first glance those selling Model 2.0 
seems to have been much more successful than their predecessors were with Model 1.0.  However 
countries seldom do things because economists produced persuasive theories or evidence that it would 
be good to do them.  Indeed, often tax researchers have not so much led the reform elephant as 
mopped up behind it.  VAT, for example, was developed in France and then adopted in Europe as a 
better way to administer a general consumption tax, particularly with regard to cross-border trade. 
Countries lowered and flattened income taxes at least in part because more people rose into tax 
brackets formerly occupied, if at all, by a few rich people and in part because of perceived international 
competition for capital (Leibech and Hochgatterer 2012).  To some extent, the role of tax economists 
was simply to rationalize developments that had already occurred in the real world.   
 Moreover, neither the level nor the structure of taxation in most developing countries has actually 
changed much.  The UN Millennium Project (2005), much like Kaldor (1963), informed developing 
countries that on average they needed to mobilize another 4 percent of GDP in tax revenue to achieve 
the minimal Millennium Development Goals – that is, to increase from their current average tax ratio of 
17-18 percent to something closer to 22 percent.  More recently, the IMF (2011) was a bit more 
cautious, suggesting only that a 2 to 4 percent increase in the ratio was both desirable and feasible in 
most developing countries – though noting that most could likely get up to 2 percent more from VAT 
alone with no great effort.  Despite such optimism, in reality the tax-GDP ratio has, on average, hardly 
increased in developing countries over the last 30 years.  Indeed, taxes went up relatively much more in 
developed countries during this period (Bahl and Bird 2008).  Of course, a few fast-growing countries 
from time to time have managed to achieve and even exceed the UN-prescribed rate of increase but it is 
not yet clear that the new levels reached will be sustainable. 
Fiscal inertia seems to be more common than fiscal growth, with many countries remaining for relatively 
long periods at more or less the same tax-GDP level.  Kaldor (1963) noted long ago that the main reason 
taxes have not gone up in most countries is because it is seldom in the interest of those who dominate 
the political institutions to increase taxes.  Economists – on the whole not a group keen to man the 
revolutionary barricades – have found it difficult to suggest an alternative explanation.  They often end 
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up advocating little more than the always unwelcome medicine of fiscal puritanism – a hard-to-swallow 
mix of fiscal abstinence (stop wasting money) and fiscal rectitude (collect the taxes you impose). 
There is some evidence of similar ‘inertia’ even in tax structures.  Although there is considerable 
variation within the diverse group of developing countries, often less has been going on han is apparent 
to eyes dazzled by the seemingly endless changes of tax rates and tax legislation.  For example, although 
how consumption taxes are collected has changed to some extent as countries have adopted VATs, the 
relative importance of such taxes on average has hardly changed at all as increased VAT collections 
(often on the same import base) have been offset by decreases in customs revenues (Martinez-Vazquez 
and Bird 2011).13  Despite the fiscal challenges they face and the many tax changes they have made, 
when it comes to tax reality in many countries, “business as usual” is often a better description than “tax 
reform”.  
Although poorer countries are more constrained than richer countries, they too have considerable 
discretion as to how much they raise and how they raise it (as well as how they spend it). Both 
opportunity and choice affect tax levels and tax structures.  Originally, most studies of tax determinants 
stressed opportunity – that taxes mainly reflected economic structure. Per capita GDP and the non-
agricultural share of GDP continue to be important explanatory factors. However, more recent studies 
using such ‘demand-side’ variables as quality of governance, inequality, size of informal sector, and tax 
morale (e.g. Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler 2008) suggest that to a significant extent tax levels in 
different countries reflect people’s perception of the quality and responsiveness of the state.  Kaldor 
(1963) was thus right in the important sense that countries that wish to tax more need governing 
institutions that facilitate rather than obstruct the achievement of this goal.  Enhancing the rule of law, 
reducing corruption and the shadow economy, and improving tax morale are neither simple nor easy.  
But advising countries to work on such matters may nonetheless be more sensible than suggesting they 
wait around until someone finds oil on their territory.  Indeed, since oil money all too often has 
exacerbated governance problems (Collier and Hoefler 2005) many urge that such countries usually 
need to improve governance – even though, with easy money from oil, experience suggests that most 
are less likely to do so.  
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 Moreover, in some countries the change in consumption taxes has been more in form than in reality as the ‘new’ 
VAT continues to be interpreted and administered in more or less the same way as the ‘old’ excises or turnover 
taxes that were presumably replaced.  
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How countries structure their tax systems depends upon the need and desire for increased public 
services, the capacity to levy taxes effectively, and preferences for such public policy goals as attaining a 
desired distribution of income and wealth and increasing the rate of growth.  In a study based on 
observations for 100 countries over the 1975-92 period Kenny and Winer (2006) show that countries 
tend to utilize all tax bases more as tax levels rise.  For example, if one compares OECD countries to 
Latin American countries, the latter collect less as a share of GDP from every tax source (Barreix and 
Roca 2006).   Unsurprisingly, how heavily countries rely on different tax bases over time increases more 
on bases that become relatively more important.  For example, as oil production and prices increase, oil 
countries get more revenue from this source.14  Further, much as argued in the traditional ‘tax handles’ 
approach (Musgrave 1969) taxes on particular bases tend to increase when the administrative costs of 
imposing those taxes decline. For example, rising education levels lower the cost of imposing personal 
income taxes and are hence associated with more reliance on such taxes.15  Kenny and Winer (2006) 
suggest that an additional critical factor influencing tax structure choices is the extent to which reliance 
on particular tax sources can be translated into effective political opposition. For example, as Prichard 
(2009) shows for Ghana, fuel taxes may be derailed by strong opposition from well-organized taxi and 
truck operators.  
Only when the basic underlying political, economic, and administrative realities that underlie tax policy 
change is a country likely to alter its tax mix substantially. Even a good tax reform – one that raises 
(more) revenue in a more efficient and equitable fashion – is perhaps unlikely to be more effective than, 
say, a good seat belt law. That is, if everything else stayed the same, many lives would be saved. 
However, things do not stay the same because some people appear to drive more recklessly when they 
feel safer, so overall highway death rates may decline less than expected. Similarly, if countries tend to 
achieve equilibrium with respect to the size and nature of their fiscal systems that reflects the balance of 
political and other factors, they tend to stay there until “shocked” to a new equilibrium.16  One 
implication is that ‘reform’ in one aspect of tax policy may often be offset by changes elsewhere that 
                                                          
14
 On the other hand, expanding trade has in recent years not been associated with increasing dependence on 
trade taxes (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005).   
15
 As Gordon and Li (2009) emphasize, financial development and the expansion of the corporate sector also 
increase the importance of income taxes. 
16
 Along similar lines, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) called the discrete jump in tax effort and public expenditure in 
post-war Britain a '‘displacement effect’: general perceptions about what is a tolerable level of taxation tend to be 
stable until shocked by a social upheaval so that levels of taxation that would have been previously intolerable 
become acceptable and remain at the new higher level after the social perturbations have disappeared.  The jump 
in tax levels in Nicaragua after the Sandinista revolution – and the maintenance of the new, higher level – under 
subsequent conservative governments provides another example.  
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tend to return to the pre-reform situation.  For instance, one of the most striking features of the various 
major tax reforms that had took place in Mexico in earlier decades (Gil-Diaz and Thirsk, 1997) was how 
little effect they had on Mexico’s tax ratio.  As Martinez-Vazquez (2001) discusses, most of these 
reforms appear, either intentionally or by coincidence, to have been undermined by unrelated ad hoc 
measures or offset by administrative deterioration.  
On the whole, we still have relatively little understanding of the likely effect of tax changes on either 
political or -- despite the extensive literature asserting the contrary -- economic outcomes.  For example, 
only a few small mice of agreement have yet emerged from the mountain of empirical studies on the 
impact of taxes on growth (OECD 2008) although, as Martinez-Vazquez, Vulovic and Liu 2011) show, the 
evidence that heavier reliance on ‘direct’ taxes adversely affects growth continues to mount.  Of course, 
much of the evidence is derived from cross-country studies that are inherently able to cast at best 
limited light on the impact of a particular tax change in the setting of a particular country. 17  Still, as 
countries develop and become more open, all are faced to some extent by the task of capturing in the 
tax base expanding production and consumption activities without either overstraining administrative 
capacity or unduly discouraging the expansion of such activities.  Unfortunately, the leading edge of 
growth in many countries – outward-oriented development -- may all too easily become the bleeding 
edge of the fiscal system as it becomes more and more difficult to levy taxes effectively on capital 
income, thus potentially exacerbating internal inequalities and political pressures on the tax system.  
Moreover, even the best tax laws yield revenue only when they can be effectively implemented. In 
many developing countries, there is a large traditional agricultural sector that is not easily taxed.  Often 
there is also a significant informal (shadow) economy that is largely outside the formal tax structure -- 
an economy that may itself to some extent be a function of how taxes are designed and implemented 
(Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace 2004).  Such problems are more difficult when their scale is great 
and available administrative capacity limited.  How revenue is raised -- the effect of revenue-generation 
effort on equity, on the political fortunes of the government, and on the level of economic welfare -- 
may be equally (or more) important as how much revenue is raised.  The best tax administration is not 
simply that which collects the most revenues; facilitating tax compliance is not simply a matter of 
adequately penalizing noncompliance; tax administration depends as much or more on private as on 
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 Salmon (2012) presents a nice critique of the limited usefulness of cross-country empirical studies as a basis for 
political economy analysis, while Lindert (2003) emphasizes the extent to which detailed characteristics of tax 
design and implementation and market structure that are not easily captured in econometric models determine 
the impact of specific policies in different countries.  
12 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
public actions (and reactions); and there is a complex interaction between various environmental 
factors, the specifics of substantive and procedural tax law, and the outcome of administrative effort.  
All this makes tax administration complex and assessing the relation between administrative effort and 
revenue outcomes a difficult task.  Work on such issues has barely begun even in developed countries, 
and we know far less than we should about many aspects of the critical administrative dimension of 
taxation in developing countries.18 
Much the same can be said of an even more fundamental determinant of tax system change – the 
political economy of taxation. Those who design and implement tax systems, like those who try to 
escape them, probably consider themselves to be eminently ‘practical’ people responding to the world 
around them as they see it.  Keynes (1936, 384-85) once said that “practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite free from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist…..soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.”  This 
dictum may both unduly flatter economists and give too little weight to the fact that tax policy is shaped 
not only by ideas but also by vested interests, changing economic conditions, administrative constraints 
and technological possibilities, and, especially, by the nature and functioning of the political institutions 
within which these factors affect policy decisions.  But it is fundamentally correct: ideas matter. 
So, however, do interests and institutions. The best tax system for any country is presumably one that 
fits its economic structure, its capacity to administer taxes, its public service needs, and its access to 
such other sources of revenue as aid or oil. It must also take into account such nebulous but important 
factors as ‘tax morale’, ‘tax culture’, and, perhaps above all, the level of ‘trust’ existing between people 
and their government.  Tax policy decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Nor are tax systems 
implemented in one.  The taxes that are adopted in a country and how they are administered are always 
and everywhere both path-dependent and context-specific.  They reflect the outcome of complex social 
and political interactions between different groups in society in a specific institutional context 
established by history and state administrative capacity.  In turn taxes may themselves to some extent 
influence the showing the context, nature and outcomes of such interactions (Moore 2007).  Like tax 
administration, tax politics deserves close attention by those interested in improving tax policy although 
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as yet it is far from clear how, if at all, closer consideration of the political economy aspect is likely to 
affect the substance of tax policy advice.19  
Until recently, however, little research has focused on either the administrative or the political 
dimensions of taxation.  Economists understandably have approached the tax-development nexus from 
their own disciplinary perspective, as illustrated by the prolonged theoretical discussion among tax 
economists about new forms of progressive direct consumption taxes (McLure and Zodrow 2007).  This 
discussion may have led many economists to change their view of the relative virtues of taxing 
consumption versus income.  In the policy world, however, its main consequence may have been to 
foster a better -- but still not very (if at all) progressive -- indirect consumption tax in the form of VAT.20  
Of course, VAT has swept the board in the developing world for reasons that have little, if anything, to 
do with the internalization of lessons from research  -- in part owing to the reputed administrative 
advantages of VAT compared to other forms of sales taxes, in part reflecting the desire of the IMF and 
other external advisers (as well as governments) to increase the income-elasticity of consumption taxes, 
and perhaps especially by the need to replace the revenue from customs duties affected by trade 
liberalization. 
Similarly, much economic research suggests that high marginal tax rates (MTRs) can induce a variety of 
changes in the behaviour of taxpayers, with resulting economic costs.  Tax-induced changes may include 
changes in hours worked and in labor force participation, the substitution of non-taxable for taxable 
consumption, changes in the timing of income realization, changes in the form of compensation 
(including incorporation), use of deferred compensation and other tax shelters, and increased evasion.  
A high MTR is most costly when applied to a tax base that is more responsive to tax rates — when, for 
example, affected taxpayers may easily substitute from paid work to unpaid family care, or from 
conventional employment to activities in the less-taxed informal sector, or they may even move to 
another country.  Such behavioral responses to taxation can be usefully summarized in the “elasticity of 
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 For an interesting overview of the rapidly growing literature on PEA (political economy analysis) – though 
without specific reference to tax policy – see Copestake and Williams (2012).  Some aspects of PEA with respect to 
taxation are considered in the Latin American context in IDB (2006) and more generally in Brautigam, Fjeldstad and 
Moore (2007).  Economists too have good work on the political economy of taxation, as summarized a few years 
ago by Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003). For the most part, however, this work understandably plays to our 
disciplinary expertise in model-building and econometrics.  As Frey and Steiner (2012) emphasize, despite such 
interesting recent works as Acemoglu and Robinson (2011) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2011), all too many 
economists still seem to assume that governments want and are able actually to maximize social welfare.  
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The progressivity (or otherwise) of VAT is discussed in Bird and Gendron (2007), as well as Jenkins, Jenkins and 
Kuo (2006). 
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taxable income” (Feldstein 1995) — the average percentage decrease in a taxpayer’s taxable income 
due to all behavioral responses when the taxpayer’s marginal share (one minus the marginal tax rate) is 
decreased by 1 per cent. Examining the effects of the 1986 U.S. tax reform on a sample of taxpayers, 
Feldstein (1995) estimated the elasticity of taxable income to be quite large, with preferred estimates 
ranging from 1.0 to 1.5. To put these estimates in perspective, note that even unitary elasticity implies 
that government revenues would reach their maximum level at a tax rate of 50 per cent; further tax 
increases would actually decrease revenues. Although this approach to determining the revenue-
maximizing tax rate is an understandable approach to making old arguments about efficiency more 
meaningful and palatable to policymakers (Bird and Wallace 2005), such arguments appear to have had 
little direct influence on tax policy.  Income tax rates may have come down around the world, but there 
is little evidence that the structure of MTRs accords with what analysis suggests.21   
A recent review of optimal taxation notes that “where large gaps between theory and policy remain, the 
…question is whether policymakers need to learn more from theorists, or the other way round” 
(Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009).  With respect to taxation in developing countries, the answer 
seems clear: tax researchers need to understand the constraints and objectives facing policymakers 
before offering them pre-cut solutions to what researchers think are their problems. In fact, both the 
theory and the evidence on the size and distribution of any gains from such policies are at best 
ambiguous (Diamond and Saez 2011).  To paraphrase Shakespeare, there are more things in heaven and 
earth than are dreamt of in optimal tax theory. Not only is the world within which tax policy decisions 
are made complex; so are the motivations of those who make, and react to, such decisions.   
The reduced marginal tax rates on high income recipients and corporations found around the world 
seems less likely to reflect absorption of the lessons of optimal taxation than the globalization of 
international capital markets and the accompanying regional and international competition for capital.  
Although tax research has not yet produced convincing guidance to what a good system of international 
taxation might look like, solutions to the problems arising from the imposition of international 
constraints on domestic tax policy are perhaps more likely to emerge from the sort of ‘soft governance’ 
embodied in the endless meetings and discussions of agencies like the OECD rather than from either the 
dictates of economic theory or the rather drastic solution of creating a de facto international tax 
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authority.22 Experience shows that “…there are many problems that people are unable to solve in the 
abstract, but are able to solve when placed in a real-world context” (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, 
122). International taxation is likely to continue to be one such problem. 
Looking back at Model 2.0 with all this in mind, at best the glass seems half full from a policy 
perspective.  The core ideas of Model 2.0 -- the BBLR approach to income taxes and the VAT as a 
superior form of sales tax and the best way to replace trade taxes -- were extensively marketed to the 
developing world by fiscal missionaries from the IMF and elsewhere.  The audience was surprisingly 
receptive to the message, although the relative success of these ideas may lie at least to some extent in 
the fact that, arguably, they coincide with elite interests.  Since elites pay (or think they pay) most of the 
income taxes in developing countries they benefit directly from reduced and flatter income taxes.  Elites 
do not pay most VAT, but they do control the companies that act as collection agents for this tax and it 
is generally in their interests to extend the tax base as far as possible in order to draw into the tax net as 
much of their ‘informal sector’ competition as possible.  Whatever the reasons, the generally sensible 
core advice of Model 2.0 was widely accepted. On the other hand, not only was inadequate attention 
paid to both the administrative and political economy aspects of taxation but a number of substantive 
fiscal issues important in many countries – for example, subnational taxation23 and payroll taxes and 
non-tax revenues more generally24  -- have been unduly neglected.  More importantly, despite much 
expert work by the IMF and others on tax administration in recent years, as yet little has been done to 
relate this work adequately to policy, let alone to take adequate account of the country-specific political 
economy considerations that in end seem to be the primary determinants of both policy uptake and 
policy success.  At best, what may emerge from the experience recounted to this point is what perhaps  
might be labeled Development Tax Model 3.0.  
 
Towards Development Tax Model 3.0 
What might such a new standard ‘model’ look like?  Before attempting to answer this question, it may 
be helpful to consider the sorts of objectives and instruments that need to be taken more carefully into 
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 Musgrave (2002) remains perhaps the most interesting attempt to derive policy rules from theory; for different 
views on international tax policy see e.g. Tanzi (1995) and Bird and Mintz (2003). 
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 See Bahl and Bird (2008a) and Bird (2011b). 
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 On the importance of non-tax revenues, see Bird and Das-Gupta (2012); Alm and Lopez-Castaño (2006) and Bird 
and Smart (2012) discuss some aspects of payroll taxation.  Another unduly neglected issue, natural resource 
taxation, has recently received much more attention (Daniel, Keen and McPherson 2010).   
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account by tax advisers.  One useful starting point is to think about the different roles taxes play – for 
example, stabilization (revenue sufficient to finance public expenditure in a sustainable way), 
redistribution (altering the market-generated distribution of income and wealth), and regulation 
(affecting private sector allocative decisions) – and to consider how different taxes may be linked to the 
achievement of these goals.25 From this perspective, the main role of a broad-based single rate VAT (like 
a similar payroll tax or a flat-rate income tax) is simply to raise revenue, while progressive personal 
income taxes and wealth taxes are presumably intended mainly as redistributive instruments, and 
excises as well as the corporate income tax (in addition to backing up the personal income tax) play 
primarily a regulatory role (Avi-Yonath 2009). 
The Distributional  Objective 
Consider first the issue of progressivity.  Model 1.0 assumed (roughly) the more progressive the tax 
system the better, while Model 2.0 in effect assumed tax progressivity was not an important issue.  
Neither assumption provides either a correct or a useful starting point.  On one hand, progressivity is 
not costless.  On the other, in the policy context of most countries tax advice that assumes distributional 
considerations are either unimportant or can easily be achieved by (usually unspecified) adjustments 
somewhere else in the tax-transfer system is of little use. Distributional issues often dominate in the 
minds of those who shape policy and the general inability of politicians to understand tax incidence and 
of tax economists to say much that policymakers consider relevant about distributional issues has often 
relegated the economics of taxation to the sidelines in policy discussion. Although distributional studies 
are often both conceptually and empirically difficult and model, let alone to convey to decision-makers, 
the reality is that equity concerns lie at the heart of many public policy questions.  Unless tax economists 
deal explicitly and satisfactorily with this issue their advice is unlikely to be influential.  
Policy-makers often talk about poverty-alleviation and more egalitarian income distribution.  In practice, 
however, their real distributional concerns about policy outcomes are often driven less by the desire to 
maximize social welfare than by more narrowly focused political economy considerations: How will this 
region or locality be affected relative to that one? Will home-owners be disadvantaged or benefited? 
How will the old be affected? What will be the effects on farmers and the rural sector? Will this or that 
industry be better or worse off? Although such questions are seldom considered in mainline tax 
research they are frequently critical in shaping policy decisions.  To resonate in policy circles, research 
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needs to speak to such questions.  If experts want their research to be taken seriously, they need to be 
able to tell good stories that relate to the concerns that people have – regardless of whether those 
concerns are seen as central, or even acceptable, within the accepted disciplinary research model.26  
Tax policy is not just about economics but about politics.  To provide useful advice on tax issues in any 
country one must understand the political as well as the economic factors that shape policy decisions 
and policy outcomes. As noted earlier, the level and structure of taxation reflect deep-seated 
institutional factors that, in the absence of severe shocks, do not change quickly.  Tax policy decisions 
reflect the outcome of complex social and political interactions between different groups in society in an 
institutional context established by history and state administrative capacity. Taxation is not just a 
means of financing government; it is also a very visible component of the social contract underlying the 
state.  Citizens are more likely to comply with tax laws if they accept the state as legitimate and credible 
and are thus to some extent both willing to support it and afraid of what will happen to them if they 
don’t.  Tax policy changes thus depend largely on how different political groups perceive proposed 
changes and how they react to these perceptions: as Lledo, Schneider, and Moore (2003) put it, any 
major tax reform is thus always and everywhere “an exercise in political legitimation.”   
Those who have to pay more must be convinced that they will get something worthwhile for their 
money.  Those who do not want to pay more must not be able to block reform and, in the end, must be 
willing to go along without taking to the hills in revolt or fleeing the country.27 Those within government 
and in the private sector who implement the reform must support it or at least not actively sabotage it. 
And of course politicians must see sufficient support to warrant putting reform not only on the agenda 
but on the ground in practice as well as law. 
To illustrate how little research usually has to do with policy consider, for instance, property taxes in the 
United States. Although research on this tax has long been a major industry it is hard to detect much, if 
any, effect on actual tax policy as a result. 28 For example, the literature demonstrates clearly that taxes 
on property are decidedly superior to taxes on property transfers; yet the latter are invariably much 
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 As US experience with death taxes illustrates (Graetz and Shapiro 2005), one well-told story, even if not true, 
may outweigh 100 well-done econometric studies.   
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 Or, at the extreme, perhaps creating their own country: Rabushka (2008, 868) concludes his recent exhaustive 
recent review of taxation in colonial America with the unequivocal (though controversial) statement that “The 
American Revolution….was a tax revolt, first and foremost.” 
28
 Witness the major survey papers by Zodrow (2001) and Fischel (2001): the rate of production has not slowed 
down, as Augustine et al. (2009) demonstrates. 
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more politically popular and, in most developing countries, often more important in revenue terms. 
Property tax research and property tax policy appear to be activities carried out by different people in 
different rooms who do not communicate well with each other.   
Excises are another ancient tax that still generates significant revenues in many countries.  Countless 
studies have considered the efficiency effects of taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco.  Again, 
however, such studies have had little perceptible effect on either the level or structure of these taxes.29 
Much the same is true with respect to taxes on vehicles and fuel, despite the substantial economic 
literature suggesting alternative designs of these levies on efficiency grounds.  Perceptions about the 
effects on changes on equity and politics almost always trump efficiency analysis even if – unusually -- 
the latter is presented to policymakers in both language and a context to which they can relate.  
In one way or another, perceived fairness is thus always a key issue in designing any tax regime. Indeed, 
from one perspective, taxes exist primarily to secure equity.  National governments do not need taxes to 
secure funds: they can simply print the money required to fund operations.  The tax system is in effect   
a mechanism designed to take money away from the private sector in as efficient, equitable, and 
administratively inexpensive way as possible.  Of course, what is considered equitable or fair by one 
person may differ from the conceptions held by others.  Some may stress horizontal over vertical equity, 
for example, as OECD (2006) argues is increasingly true in developed countries and as Bergman (2003) 
suggests is also the case in Latin America. Others may tilt the balance the other way, as did the 
‘progressive’ thinking underlying Model 1.0.  One way or another, however, equity also matters in tax 
policy discussions. 
Does this means tax progressivity matters? Harberger (2006) argues it does not matter much: insofar as 
government policy affects the distribution of income and wealth, spending – such as providing 
education (even when financed from regressive taxes) -- is much more important than taxing the rich.  
Even in a relatively advanced country like Chile with an unusually well-developed and effective tax 
administration the progressivity of the income tax simply cannot have any significant influence on 
distributional outcomes (Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz 1999).  One may argue that such taxes share the 
burden of government more fairly and may even be essential to building social trust, but one cannot 
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argue persuasively in the context of most developing countries that they are likely to be effective 
redistributive tools.  As Lindert (2003) shows, it was not by taxing the rich but by taxing the growing 
middle class that developed countries ‘grew’ large states.  Similarly, in notoriously unequal Latin 
America income tax only began to be relatively efficient and effective revenue raiser to any extent when 
it began recently in (some) countries to bite into the middle class, essentially by combining reduced top 
rates with lowering the level at which those reduced rates come into play (Lora and Cardenas 2006). 
How to Sell Tax Reform 
 Process issues are often more important than substantive issues like efficiency or equity when it comes 
to selling tax reform. Marketing matters.  Those who want serious tax reform need to understand not 
only tax theory and practice but also the dark art of political salesmanship.  This warning needs to be 
taken particularly seriously by those who are concerned not only with how tax revenues may build up a 
more sustainable state but also with how the revenues are collected may contribute to, or detract from, 
the long-term development of state legitimacy.  Consider for example the question of ‘fiscal illusion.’  
Which is more important: what taxes do or what people think they do?  Economists have always focused 
on the objective reality of outcomes and assumed that citizen-voters will eventually if not immediately 
see through the veil of perception and make policy decisions on the basis of reality.  But is this right? 
Even if in the long run budget constraints will force people to face up to fiscal reality, history 
demonstrates everywhere that policy decisions have usually been shaped mainly by governed more by 
perceptions than by reality.30 
As an example, consider earmarking and what Breton (1996) calls the ‘Wicksellian connection’ between 
the two sides of the budget.  Establishing such a linkage in the minds of people is critical to the whole 
issue of state legitimation. This argument is, for example, one of the key elements in explaining the 
popularity (and mixed results) of fiscal decentralization around the world (Bahl and Bird 2008a). 
Earmarking – linking specific revenue sources to specific expenditures -- has existed since the earliest 
recorded fiscal practices (Webber and Wildavsky 1986).  Both politicians and taxpayers often find 
earmarking an attractive and feasible way to finance social security, road works, education, 
environmental programs, and other good things. Politicians like earmarking as a means of reducing 
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taxpayer resistance to higher taxes. Officials like to have secure revenue sources dedicated to fund their 
activities. Taxpayers like the greater accountability they perceive with respect to how their tax dollars 
are spent.  Economists, however, have come only lately to the table when it comes to understanding 
and analyzing this common fiscal practice.31 
Budgeting experts, for instance, have almost unanimously condemned earmarking as a bad idea, arguing 
that no rational budgetary process is conceivable unless the practice is essentially banned.  Although the 
implicit (and implausible) assumption in this argument is that budgetary decisions are (or should be) 
made by a government with the sole objective of maximizing social welfare, the condemnation of 
earmarking for distorting expenditure allocation is supported by the fact that rampant earmarking has 
certainly at times had this effect in some countries.  This approach remained essentially unchallenged in 
the public finance world until Buchanan (1963) revived an important efficiency argument (made earlier 
by Wicksell) in favor of establishing as tight a linkage as possible between taxing and spending 
decisions.32  In this approach, earmarking is seen not simply as a way to secure political consent for a tax 
increase but rather – under certain specific conditions – perhaps the best way to deal with the 
fundamental normative problem of public economics -- how to provide people with the public services 
they really want -- where ‘want’ is interpreted in the only economically relevant sense of what they 
(collectively, as determined through their political institutions) are willing to pay for.33 
The economic case for earmarking is strongest when there is a close benefit link between taxes and 
spending. Benefit-related earmarking (like user charges) if properly designed and implemented reveals 
taxpayer preferences for public services and sends a clear demand signal to the public sector about how 
much of a service should be supplied.  Since revenues received (and only such revenues) are spent on 
the service in question, supply automatically adjusts to demand and economic efficiency is achieved.  
Such earmarking may also be considered equitable in the sense that no one receives a service without 
paying for it or pays without receiving service. Provided that the public service thus financed is similar to  
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 Whether earmarking increases public trust in government or reduces it depends very much upon the context.  
For example, earmarking (hypothecation) was widespread in Britain at the turn of the 19
th
 century but was then 
rejected and replaced in mid-century by the ‘Gladstonian’ approach to public finance, an important feature of 
which was a consolidated budget with no earmarking (Daunton 2001).  Interestingly, the stated reason for the turn 
away from earmarking was to restrict the growth the state in order to restore public trust in the neutrality of the 
public finances in the face of the then-common perception that hypothecated revenues were being (mis)used by 
the political elite to expand the ‘fiscal-military’ state in their own interests.    
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 As Sijbren Cnossen, quoting Richard Goode, noted in a comment on an earlier draft of this paper: “if you want 
the ends you must also want the means.” 
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a privately supplied service in the sense that both an individual’s consumption of the service and the 
marginal cost of providing the service can be satisfactorily measured, most people would probably 
consider such levies fair on the whole.34  Since informed and rational taxpayers – ‘economic men’ as it 
were -- are aware that when payments are extracted from them the funds will be used to pay for certain 
expenditures, they will presumably support the taxes or charges if and only if they support the 
expansion in the supply of government services for which the earmarked revenues are targeted.  In 
these circumstances, both tax and expenditure decisions will be made more rationally than under 
general fund financing.   
Unsurprisingly, such perfection seems seldom to be observed in practice.  Many factors may explain the 
relatively disappointing performance of earmarking in the real world:  the cost and difficulty of 
controlling many separate funds (Fullerton 1996), the inappropriateness of many of the linkages that 
have been established for political reasons between particular revenues and expenditures (McCleary 
1991), and the understandable resistance of citizens to attempts to charge for services that initially were 
provided ‘free’ or at highly subsidized prices (Bird and Tsiopoulos 1997).   Most earmarking seen in most 
countries makes little economic sense. Often, not only is there no logical link between the tax imposed 
and the spending for which it is designated but there is also no solid budgetary link.  How much is 
collected from the designated source and how much is spent on the designated activity are essentially 
separate decisions, decided independently. What is the rationale for such non-logical non-linkages, and 
do they matter at all?  These are not trivial questions.  Many countries have many earmarked revenues, 
and new ones are created or at least suggested every day, not least in the environmental field.  
One important rationale for imposing taxes designated to be spent on this or that popular activity is 
simply revenue enhancement. Politicians hope to justify the imposition of a new tax by capitalizing on 
the presumed ‘halo effect’ of something popular like education, health or ‘greenness.’ Earmarking may 
also sometimes be motivated in some instances by rent-seeking behavior.  As an example, an increase in 
tobacco taxes with the proceeds earmarked for increased health spending may receive support from 
non-smokers, who would not pay the tax but want more spending on health; from smokers, who feel 
guilty about smoking and are worried about the health consequences of smoking; and  from people in 
the health business who (presumably) not only believe that higher taxes on tobacco and more spending 
on health are good but also realize that they would be clear gainers if health spending increases as a 
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result (which may not be the case).  Some studies (Cnossen and Smart 2005) suggest that the result may 
be that tobacco taxes (which are highly regressive) may already be higher in some countries than can be 
rationalized on externality grounds.  But can politicians be expected to resist such a win-win 
combination?35  
If earmarking makes sense, by definition, it is economically sensible.  When there is not a clear benefit 
rationale, it is hard for an economist to defend any form of non-benefit earmarking that actually affects 
expenditures (in the sense that the level of expenditure on any particular activity is determined at the 
margin by the amount of revenue collected from any particular tax or charge).  But if calling a new tax a 
‘health tax’ makes it more marketable, provided the tax is better than the alternatives and spending is 
not affected, should economists be perturbed by mislabeling?36  Such concerns, like those with respect 
to various perspectives on tax equity, need careful consideration by tax advisers.  
Setting the Target 
The implicit policy target set in both Models 1.0 and Model 2.0 was, to oversimplify, an ‘ideal’ system 
derived from economic theory.  The most popular alternative target is probably what is usually called 
‘best practice’ – that is, developing countries are in effect advised to adopt the pattern found in some 
‘model’ country – perhaps some statistical average of better (best) performing countries, as defined in 
terms of growth rates or some other ‘output’ measure or simply chosen on a best-judgment basis.  
Benchmarking as a way of establishing standards for evaluating the performance of tax systems has 
become increasingly popular in recent years (Gallagher 2005).37 Benchmarking can be thought of as a 
systematic process for identifying and measuring ‘performance gaps’ between one's own outputs and 
processes and those of others, usually those recognized as leaders in the field or between actual 
performance and some hypothetical ‘ideal’ performance.  The underlying motivation is presumably that 
by identifying such gaps one can perhaps begin to understand why they exist and how they might be 
closed in the country being studied.   
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unlikely to have much effect on health spending.  Earmarking such taxes to e.g. ‘anti-tobacco’ advertising 
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 For an argument that they should indeed lose sleep over fostering political deception, see Bird (2010), although 
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 The following argument is developed at more length with respect to tax administration in Vazquez-Caro and Bird 
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The basic logic of benchmarking is sound and should in principle be both attractive and useful even to 
those being benchmarked: if others can deliver similar results more effectively and efficiently than you 
do, why not learn from them? However, if the intended objective is to provide useful guidelines for 
restructuring a particular tax system – to lay the basis for successful tax reform -- most benchmarking 
exercises fall far short.    Benchmarking may sometimes help to identify areas of possible weakness, that 
is, deviations from some ‘norm’ that may perhaps be symptoms of problems that might usefully be 
examined more closely.  However, although such exercises may lead to the collection and analysis of 
useful data, in themselves they neither supply clear explanations of the underlying problems nor insights 
that are likely to prove helpful in resolving those problems: problems are not solutions and possibilities 
are not certainties. Good benchmarking from the perspective of any country cannot be simply a matter 
of blindly adopting the practices of others, even those considered by experts to be ‘best in class.’   
The real motivation for benchmarking is not so much to provide solutions as to help pick out areas in 
which there may be opportunities for change and improvement.  In the case of revenue systems, as 
emphasized earlier, very often such opportunities are likely to be ‘soft’ (qualitative) in nature and 
difficult to identify very precisely, let alone resolve.  Benchmarking exercises like those increasingly 
popular with aid agencies that focus primarily on ‘hard’ (quantifiable) data are all too likely to provide 
seriously incomplete information and may lead to changes (such as new technology) being implemented 
in an unsustainable manner.  It is always tempting to look at what ‘might be’ and to set it up as a target; 
but it almost always a mistake when it comes to institutional reform to attempt to run before one can 
walk.  As Schick (2012) has recently emphasized with respect to budgetary practices, it is usually more 
critical to get the basics right than to strive for any sort of perfection.  A country without control over 
cash budgeting is not well advised to attempt to implement accrual accounting.  Similarly, a country 
without a good taxpayer identification system and good telecommunications infrastructure (not to 
mention a reliable electricity supply) is usually not well advised to move immediately to a web-based tax 
system. This does not mean that countries cannot and should not in some instances try to move, as it 
were, from the 19th to the 21st century rather than painfully repeating the learning experiences more 
developed countries underwent in the intervening century.  Nor does it mean that it is may not 
sometimes be useful to hold out immediately unattainable targets as inspirational and possibly 
motivating goals.  But it does mean that when it comes to implementing tax reform close attention 
needs to be paid to such critical ‘soft’ elements of organizational ‘culture’ as the philosophy, behavior 
and style of management, as well as its strategy and the degree of participation, communication, 
24 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
recognition, empowerment, and ‘ownership’ in the environment in which tax policy is formulated, 
designed and implemented (Gill 2001).  
Of course, no one wants to hear that it may take decades before they are in a position to undertake this 
or that particular reform successfully, whether in tax structure or tax administration.  No one wants to 
have to rethink their whole way of doing business (and politics) simply in order to make this or that tax 
incentive potentially useful (rather than, as usual, wasteful) or to get any real benefits from some 
attractive ‘free’ information technology being offered by an aid agency.  What people want to hear is 
rather that they can simply bolt on this or that new feature to their existing system without making any 
more basic changes, and still get good, quick, and preferably quantifiable results. Similarly, many 
overweight people want to believe that there is a simple ‘magic bullet’ -- a pill, a potion, a machine -- 
that will make the problem go away.  They do not want to hear that what they really need to do is to 
change their diet and exercise regime for life.  It always seems much easier to buy a new IT approach off 
the shelf or to hire additional or better qualified (and paid) staff than to change how one makes policy 
or manages its implementation.  It seems easier; but it is also  seems much less likely to produce ‘good’ 
or ‘better’ results, let alone the ‘best’ results that are presumably the desired end goal. 
Few countries that are currently considered ‘developed’ (US, Germany, Japan) or ‘successful’ (China, 
Korea) followed anything like ‘best practice’ benchmarking as a guide to policy change.  Instead, one 
way or another – and the way was very different in each of the countries mentioned – they gradually 
altered their tax structures and administrations over time in response to (almost never in advance of) 
changes in the underlying political, economic, and social environment that requires (and is needed to 
support and sustain) such improvements.  It is far from clear why more can or should be expected of 
other countries. 
The Need for a Long-Term Perspective 
Viewed in long-term perspective, many developing countries have not yet completed even the earlier 
parts of the long cycle that produced the (more or less) redistributive and (more or less) growth-
facilitating fiscal states now found in most developed countries—the long preparatory period during 
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which the idea of the desirability and even necessity of a larger state and at least a mildly progressive 
fiscal system became established to different degrees in different countries.38     
In many Latin American countries, for example, inequality is a big problem (de Ferranti et al. 2004; 
Gomez Sabaini 2006).  A key, and related, governance problem in most of the same countries is lack of 
accountability.  A better tax system is critical to the solution of both problems.  Reforms that link taxes 
and benefits more tightly such as decentralization and more reliance on user charges may (like 
earmarking) sometimes help accountability -- though not necessarily reduce inequality.39  On the other 
hand, reforms that replace highly regressive and inelastic excises by a relatively non-distortionary 
general consumption tax like a VAT may actually reduce inequality—especially of course if the increased 
revenues are invested in growth-facilitating activities such as education and infrastructure.   
Many governments in developing countries -- not just those in Latin America -- are in dire straits.  Even 
countries that have reached relatively safe harbors politically, achieving a certain degree of legitimacy 
and stability, are often in an economically precarious situation.  The budget is politically and 
economically constrained.  Life is difficult.  Nothing can be done.  All this may be true to some extent, 
but it is also both too much a counsel of despair and too easy a way out.  Even in the most hopeless 
situations something usually can be done to improve matters.  No doubt there will continue to be 
considerable dispute over what should be done to improve tax systems.  Indeed, in most countries it 
would be better if there was more informed public dispute about such matters because unless and until 
an adequate degree of political consensus on what should be done is achieved, no significant tax 
changes are likely to be made. In short, to a considerable extent the main tax challenge facing many 
developing countries is simply that there is as yet no implicit “… social contract between governments 
and the general population of the kind that is embedded in taxation and fiscal principles and practices in 
politically more stable parts of the world” (Lledo, Schneider, and Moore 2004, 39).   
Such principles do not become embedded either painlessly or quickly.  The specific substantive 
suggestions that Lledo, Schneider, and Moore (2004) make to improve matters -- such as better VAT 
administration on a broader base --are already the stuff of countless existing reports and most countries 
                                                          
38
 Compare the different, but parallel, stories told by Lindert (2003) and Alesina and Angeletos (2003) about how 
different developed countries have reached quite different fiscal equilibria.  Why should uniform outcomes be 
expected in the much more heterogeneous developing world? 
39
 Instead of improving matters, wrongly handled each of these approaches may end up worsening them if the 
reformed institutions are captured by particular interests as happens all too easily even in developed and 
democratic countries (Berry 2009).  There is no such thing as a free lunch when it comes to institutional change. 
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probably should in their own interests do many of the good things that experts advise.  But the question 
is why so many have done so little.  Lledo, Schneider, and Moore (2004, 40) suggest, perhaps rather 
wistfully, that if Latin American countries wish to improve their tax systems they should “…improve 
political institutions in ways that broaden and deepen social contracts.  For example, create more 
responsive and less clientelistic political parties, more cohesive and less polarised party systems, and 
improved capacity of civil society to monitor government and participate in tax debates.” In other 
words, since there cannot be good taxation (as they understand it) in the absence of good 
representation countries must get their politics right before they hope to get their tax systems right.  
This may be correct, but how useful is it to advise countries they should be something other than what 
they are?   
Much thought and practice around the world suggests that there are three basic principles of good 
taxation or, indeed, public finance more generally.40  First, using resources to finance public services 
should not result in a sacrifice of private value higher than the value of the public service produced. In 
other words, the last unit of resources transferred to the public sector -- the Marginal Cost of Funds 
(MCF) for public services (in terms of the private goods forgone) -- should just equal the marginal social 
benefit from expenditure on public services (Dahlby 2008).  The main macro lesson related to this 
principle is embodied in the practical budgetary principle of maintaining aggregate fiscal discipline to 
ensure that government spending does not exceed the resources that citizens (who presumably benefit 
from the expenditures) are willing to allocate to it through the political process.41 If fiscal discipline is not 
maintained, countries may run large and persistent budget deficits – deficits that both reflect serious 
underlying problems and make those problems worse the longer necessary corrective action is delayed.  
One of the most important changes in recent decades is that an increasing number of countries that 
have undergone such experiences have tried to reduce the likelihood of future indiscipline by 
establishing such fiscal institutions as more comprehensive and transparent budgets as well as specific 
fiscal rules like fiscal responsibility laws (Liu and Webb 2011) that may at least in some circumstances 
restrain the level and nature of government borrowing.  In this respect, expert advice, as conveyed in 
the literature and in the practice of international institutions seems on the whole to be both correct and 
                                                          
40
 The following paragraphs draw on Bird and Das-Gupta (2012); for the basic theory, see Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(2001) and for the practitioner's perspective, see Diamond (2006) and Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999). 
41
 Intergenerational considerations may complicate the attainment of fiscal sustainability in this sense just as thry 
complicate the attainment of environmental sustainability, but this point is not further discussed here. 
 Foreign Advice and Tax Policy in Developing Countries 27 
 
27 
 
widely accepted, although of course arguments about the extent to which fiscal discipline can or should 
be relaxed always occur in times like the recent (and on-going) ‘workout’ from the financial crisis. 
The second and third principles are essential if people are to perceive (and hopefully receive) sufficient 
“value for money” to be willing to sustain stronger tax systems.  The second principle is simply that, to 
maximize national economic welfare, the benefits received from the last dollar spent on each public 
service should be equal. While it is impossible to allocate budgetary resources strictly in this fashion  
because we cannot really measure well-being precisely and because it is not clear how meaningfully can 
one compare the benefits from the last dollar spent on the army to those from the last dollar spent on 
health, the idea is both clear and correct.  In some circumstances, as noted earlier, its budgetary 
embodiment may take such forms as earmarking or decentralization, even though unless carefully 
designed and implemented both approaches may sometimes create more problems than they resolve. 
More generally, however, the point is simply that since resources are scarce in developing countries, 
wasting those resources by spending them on something worth less than the opportunities forgone 
when taxes are imposed is a dead loss. In practice, the best way we know to improve the allocation of 
public resources is to measure and assess both public sector performance and the economic cost of 
public services as well and as transparently as possible.  Like adequate representative governance, 
institutions that promote transparency and accountability are essential to ensuring that people on the 
whole get what they want when they pay their taxes. Few countries do what they can or should along 
either of these lines, but progress on both the political and administrative fronts are essential to 
ensuring that reforms intended to increase and improve tax systems are sustainable.   
Much the same can be said with respect to the third principle mentioned, namely, that the services 
provided should promote the intended social outcomes (effectiveness) with as little leakage or waste as 
possible (efficiency). Although international agencies have devoted considerable effort to providing 
technical assistance in developing such institutions in some countries, not all that much success is yet 
evident.  Summing up, the main message here is simply that since spending better is, if not always a 
necessary precondition, at least a necessary accompaniment to better taxation, good tax advice requires 
much closer attention to what is to be done with the revenue than is usually recognized.  
At Last, The ‘Model’ 
After all these preliminaries, any simple presentation of a ‘standard’ model may seem impossible.  
Despite its label, Figure 3 therefore suggests more an approach than a model.  More important than the 
28 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
precise configuration of the ‘product’ – the reform package -- is the process through which it is 
conceived, ordered, assembled, delivered, and implemented satisfies the real needs and capacities of 
the country in question. 
The basic components of the tax system as set out in items 3 and 4 in Figure 3 already exist in most 
countries, although seldom in ideal form.  From a revenue perspective there are almost always have two 
basic ‘tax pillars’ – VAT and income tax, with the latter being some appropriate combination of personal, 
corporate, dual and/or flat taxes -- which will play a central role in any analysis of taxation.  Such 
common recommendations as a broad-based flat VAT (Bird and Gendron 2007) or even more recent 
arguments for dual income taxes (Bird and Zolt 2011), may provide useful starting points but 
considerable finesse is invariably needed to move very far in such directions from wherever the country 
in question is now. 
Figure 3: Development Tax Model 3.0 
1. Custom-built rather than Off-the-Shelf 
2. Time frame – short, medium, long   
3. Core revenue pillars: VAT, income tax 
4. Other taxes: Import duties, Excises (including environmental levies),  
Property tax (and other subnational taxes), Payroll taxes 
(including social contributions) 
5. Non-fiscal aspects of tax policy, notably tax incentives 
6. Critical features to be taken into account in tax analysis: 
a. Non-tax revenues 
b. Administrative aspects 
c. Linked spending (social security, earmarking, decentralization) 
d. Transfers 
e. Regulations 
f. Macroeconomic environment 
g. International aspects 
h. Decentralization policy 
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The other main revenue sources commonly found are those listed in the next row: again, there is 
nothing new about this, except perhaps bringing both property taxes (and other local taxes) and payroll 
taxes (including social contributions) into the spotlight as necessary components of tax analysis –
whether the central focus is on revenue, efficiency, equity, or administration, or any combination of 
these or other objectives -- rather than relegating them to the sidelines. 
What is more novel in this approach is the emphasis placed on the other items listed in Figure 3.  First, 
as item 1 indicates, the best approach to tax policy reform varies in every country. Reforms need to be 
‘custom-built’ like a Dell computer as the customer requires rather than following the Henry Ford 
assembly-line approach (the customer can have color he wants as long as it is black) to which both 
Models 1.0 and 2.0 seem to have lent themselves in all but the most skilled hands.  However, it seems 
both possible and desirable to develop several basic platforms for different categories of countries.   
One approach might be to develop separate basic ‘policy packages’ for countries with substantial natural 
resource revenues or those emerging from crisis or those which are significantly decentralized in a 
meaningful way, to mention three areas to which considerable attention has been paid in recent years.  
A more general approach might be to work within a framework along the lines of that recently set out 
by von Haldenwang and Ivanyna (2012), who classify countries as high, average or low tax performers 
depending on whether they are above (high), below (low) or within (average) the 95 percent confidence 
interval of the trend line relating tax ratio and log GDP per capita, and then further analyze the 46 low-
performing countries in terms of the estimated quality and effectiveness of governance, the importance 
of non-tax revenue and aid, and region on the one hand.  They conclude that the (mainly oil-producing) 
countries with high non-tax revenue (including aid) and low governance (such as Libya and Nigeria) have 
no incentive and little possibility of improving tax performance,42  that some (mainly higher-income) 
countries seem simply to have chosen the low-tax path (Hong Kong, Malaysia) and that a diverse set of 
factors ranging from lack of capacity to ‘crowding out’ of tax effort by aid may explain what is going on 
in a third, larger group of low performing countries .   
                                                          
42
 Although they include Colombia in this group, it is clearly different from any of the other countries included and 
appears to fall within this category – as von Heldenwang and Ivanyna (2012, 26) themselves note – owing to a 
combination of special circumstances in the period considered – a sharp rise in non-tax revenue, a (somewhat 
questionable) borderline rating on the ‘voice and accountability’ measure used (p.25), a more justified poor score 
with respect to corruption (p. 26), and the problems arising from substantial armed conflict.  (For a recent detailed 
discussion of the Colombian experience in this period from a different perspective, see Bird 2012a.)  
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As von Heldenwang and Ivanyna (2012) themselves conclude, much more work needs to be done – e.g. 
in improving data on tax administration and subnational revenues as well as taking into account such 
more nebulous but important factors as the differing influence in different countries at different times 
of historical, regional and explicitly redistributionist or elitist political agendas – before sufficiently 
meaningful ‘benchmarks’ for tax performance can be established to guide those assessing or shaping tax 
policy in particular countries.  Nonetheless, exercises like that in their paper may provide a useful 
starting point for such analysis.  To put much the same point another way, close consideration of the 
factors listed in item 6 of Figure 3 that prevail in a particular country is likely to point to some 
commonalities shaping policy recommendations for particular subsets of countries.  To repeat the key 
point made here, however, one should not simply assume that such commonalities exist, as was too 
often the case when models 1.0 and 2.0 guided past policy recommendations. 
Secondly, as item 2 in Figure 3 indicates, the time perspective taken in analysis matters.  If the need is 
for immediate revenue, the appropriate policies are unlikely to be the same as if the aim is to facilitate 
the long-term attainment of a more rapidly growing or more just society. Cycles matter as well as 
trends.  Is the country is in a deep recession, coming to the end of a long boom, or simply in the 
doldrums?  The acceptability, feasibility, incidence and effects of different policy recommendations are 
much more sensitive to the macroeconomic environment (row 6e) than seems to be recognized in much 
tax advice.  If, as may often be the case, the idea is to make recommendations that will both respond to 
some current pressing problems and also move the system to a more sustainable and desirable position 
over the longer term, then ‘one size’ is even less likely to fit all and much more attention than usual 
needs to be paid to how to get ‘there’ from ‘here’ over what is likely to be a bumpy and winding road.  
Phase-ins, ‘grandfathering’, and all the usual compromises found in real-world policy processes need to 
be carefully considered and where necessary included as part of the initial policy proposal if it is not to 
go seriously astray.  This is one, among many reasons, why much more attention needs to be paid to 
building up robust domestic policy ‘think tanks’, as noted in the concluding section. 
Thirdly, analysis of tax policy reform in developing countries must take tax incentives more seriously 
(item 5).  No matter how strongly or how often fiscal experts underline and demonstrate not only that 
most tax incentives yield little or nothing in the form of net gains from a societal perspective but they 
are also likely to mess up the tax system more generally, the political process will continue to churn out 
endless incentive proposals.  Perhaps the time has come to accept this reality and focus efforts not on 
fruitless efforts to get rid of incentives but rather on developing a process for limiting the damage they 
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do and perhaps, over time, reducing their number and scope.  Tax economists are basically correct in 
urging countries following the incentive path to keep it simple – that is, to aim at an investment-friendly 
environment by lowering taxes on investment in general rather than through detailed and complex 
systems attempting to direct investment into predetermined activities.  However, since no one seems to 
be listening perhaps more attention should be paid not to stopping countries doing what they seem to 
want to do but rather to ensuring that they do it in as open and transparent a way as possible in order to 
try to reduce the harm and possibly even increase the efficacy of fiscal incentives.43   In any case, the 
persistence and importance of such non-fiscal concerns in shaping tax policy deserves more careful and 
explicit attention than it has sometimes received. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, item 6 lists a number of critical factors that need to be explicitly 
considered in considering tax policy reform.  Several of the factors listed have already been discussed 
earlier to varying extents – macroeconomics, non-tax revenues, administrative aspects, decentralization, 
earmarking, and the international dimension. However, transfers and regulation may need a few words.  
The earlier discussion of the distributional aspect of taxation is sufficient reason to pay close attention 
to transfers.  In fact, with respect to both interregional and interpersonal concerns, transfers and taxes 
have to be considered together not only for distributional but also for efficiency reasons (Bahl and Bird 
2008a). As for regulation, it is impossible to understand or analyze either the effects of many taxes 
without explicitly taking into account relevant features of the regulatory environment.  For example, the 
old question of how excise taxes on alcohol affect consumption may depend to a substantial extent on 
how (and how effectively) beverage production and distribution is regulated (Bird and Wallace 2006).  
Similarly, the new question of the effects of taxes on financial transactions also depends substantially on 
how such transactions are regulated (Bierbauer 2012). 
All this may seem to complicate the work of tax advisers.  In reality, however, what Figure 3 attempts to 
do is not to set out a set of precise guidelines as to how to achieve success but a synthesis of what those 
who wish to improve fiscal outcomes need to understand if they wish their proposals to be not only 
accepted but to have positive outcomes.  To paraphrase Tolstoy, every country’s tax system is imperfect 
in its own ways and faces its own set of costs and benefits with respect to prospective policy changes.  
Designing good taxes for imperfect places is not easy, implementing them is likely to be even more 
difficult, and getting the powers-that-be to accept them may be impossible. But this is the world we live 
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 For suggestions along these line – e.g. give incentives only in the form of explicit credits against taxes otherwise 
due in order to have a fully transparent system and establish a regular formal ‘sunset’ evaluation of incentives so 
that they are periodically reviewed and cancelled if found to be ineffective -- see, for example, Bird (2000). 
32 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
in.  After fifty years of flying tax advisers, perhaps it is time to realize that the best way to realize the 
impossible dream of tax reform may be not to continue tilting quixotically against imagined windmills 
but rather to examine the ground much more closely in order to determine how a better tax system may 
perhaps be constructed modularly and incrementally in hostile terrain.    
 
Play the Right Game 
For foreign tax advisers to become any more successful in “speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979) 
or even in being heard by domestic decision-makers, they must play the right game. The tax policy world 
is very different in many respects now than it was 50 or even 20 years ago. Both the economic and the 
intellectual environments have changed.  In many countries, the debate is really less about taxes than 
about what kind of society the people who matter want -- and how it is determined which people 
matter. Ideas on the relevant balance between taxes and society forged over the first half of the 20th 
century have changed in recent years, as evidenced both by the death of death taxes in developed 
countries and by the limited success of developing countries in achieving the high levels of income 
taxation to which many of them aspired in the post-colonial period.  In most countries, it seems, the key 
question of how best to make the connection between the two sides of the budget sustainably 
operational is not simply unanswered by tax research as yet: it has not really been asked.  
History suggests that the need to secure an adequate degree of consensus from the taxed is one of the 
principal ways in which, over the centuries, democratic institutions have spread (Sokoloff and Zolt 2005).  
No non-dictatorial government in this age of information and mobility can long stay in power without 
securing a certain degree of consent from the populace, not least in the area of taxation.  State 
legitimacy thus rests to a considerable extent on the ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ of citizens with 
respect to taxation (Levi 1988).  To secure such compliance in a sustainable way tax systems must, over 
time, represent in some real sense the basic values of at least a minimum supporting coalition of the 
population.  Until an adequate degree of political consensus on what should be done is achieved, no 
significant tax reforms are likely to be made or, if made, to be sustainable. “Consensus” does not require 
everyone to agree.  But it does mean everyone has to agree (a) that the process was explicit and fair; (b) 
that they were treated well and their views were heard; and (c) that they are able not only to live with 
but to commit to the outcomes in some meaningful sense.  
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Countries have sometimes tried to finesse some of these problems by appointing some kind of special 
tax reform commission, whether foreign, domestic, or mixed.  The track record of such efforts is not 
good.  Appointing an outside group is often simply a way to postpone dealing with a problem.  However 
good the final output of such efforts may be, the results are seldom ‘owned’ by those who must sell 
them and then make them work.  Ownership matters.  So does leadership.  So does a coherent strategy, 
and of course so do adequate resources.  Good tax policy planning involves economists, lawyers, 
administrators, and – importantly – adequate discussion with taxpayers and “third party” tax collectors 
like banks and companies.  Successful tax reform involves all this plus solid and continuing political 
support and adequate administrative follow-up.  It is not easy anywhere.  But it can be done – if it is 
done right domestically.   
 
Good domestic planning and policy formulation focuses on what matters and what can be done and 
pays close attention to detail and implementation.  Building up adequate institutional capacity in the tax 
field, both inside and outside government, is critical to being able to adapt policies to changing 
circumstances and needs, thus ensuring some degree of robustness and resiliency. The role of outsiders 
such as academics and aid agencies in this process is more to be supportive when countries want to 
reform their systems than to tell them when and how to do it.44  In the end, if a country needs or wants 
better tax policy or administration, it can have it: the answer largely lies in its own hands.  Even those 
who want to do the right thing, however, can often use help in finding out just what is right and how it 
can best be done.   
 
It is always easy for those not in the game to give advice to those who are trying to play it.  It often 
seems appealing and immediately productive to establish performance benchmarks for success, to 
support this particular organizational change reform here (revenue authority) and that new technology 
(web-based technology) there, in the apparent belief that such simple ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches can 
provide quick (but sustainable!) answers to the many complex problems inherent in policy reform in 
difficult environments.  Such approaches seem appealing.  But so far at least the evidence suggests that 
most have not been very productive.  
                                                          
44
 Of course, as Sen (1999) stresses, there is always a role for outside critics and ‘goal-setters.’  However, although 
it may be not only more pleasant but sometimes even useful to stand outside and above the messy world of policy, 
the emphasis here is on how foreign advisers may help those down in the tax reform trenches to win the game 
once it begins. To do so, they must be close enough to the field of battle to understand the terrain in which it is 
fought. 
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Fifty years of experience tells us that the right game for tax researchers and outside agencies interested 
in fostering better sustainable tax systems in developing countries researchers is not the short-term 
political game in which policy decisions are made.  The right game for them is instead the long-term one 
of building up the institutional capacity both within and outside governments to articulate relevant ideas 
for change, to collect and analyze relevant data, and of course to assess and criticize the effects of such 
changes as are made.  Tax researchers in developing countries can and should play an active role in all 
these activities.  To do so, however, they often need considerably more and more sustained support 
from academic institutions abroad as well as from international agencies than is now available. Such 
long-term ‘institution-building’ activities are seldom immediately rewarding.  They appear at present to 
be out of fashion with international agencies concerned with development, where most efforts at 
present seem to focus on designing and implementing ever more rigorous ‘benchmarking’ schemes.  
Nonetheless, the long-term institution-building approach seems still to provide the most useful way in 
which foreigners may perhaps be able to assist in the formidable and on-going task of achieving more 
efficient, equitable, effective, and sustainable tax systems in developing countries. 
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